

Message Text

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ACTION NODS-00

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6591

S E C R E T AMMAN 0129

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR JO US UNSC XF

SUBJECT: TALK WITH KING -- UNSC AND MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY

REF: AMMAN 0117, AMMAN 0128

1. I SAW KING LATE AFTERNOON JANUARY 10. I PASSED ON TO HIM GREETINGS FROM THE PRESIDENT AND YOURSELF AND EXPLAINED TO HIM SOME OF THE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN WASHINGTON--OUR MEETINGS AND SOME OF THE ASPECTS OF THE ALLON VISIT. I THEN CONVEYED TO HIM ORALLY THE TALKING POINTS WHICH YOU HAVE APPROVED

2. IN REPLY, KING SAID THAT HE WISHED VERY MUCH TO RECIPROCATATE THE GREETINGS WHICH I BROUGHT HIM. HE RECALLED FOR ME A NUMBER OF THE SAME POINTS WHICH RIFAI HAD PREVIOUSLY MADE ABOUT LATTER'S VISIT TO SYRIA AND THE DEVCLOPMENT OF A NUMBER OF PRINCIPLES WHICH HE REPEATED FOR ME IN THE SAME TERMS AS RIFAI HAD EXPLAINED THEM(SEE AMMAN 0128)

3. HE ASKED ME DIRECTLY WHETHER THE US NOW INTENDED TO VETO. I REPEATED FOR HIM PARA 3 OF MY TALKING PINTS. I TOLD HIM IN ADDITION THAT IT WAS OBVIOUSLY THAT WE WOULD WANT TO SEE A RESOLUTION TEXT BEFORE MAKING ANY FINAL DECISION. HOWEVER I DID NOT WISH

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TO MISLEAD HIM ABUT THE SYRIAN JORDANIAN PRINCIPLES WHICH HE HAD

DISCUSSED WHICH WERE CLEARLY COVERED BY MY INSTRUCTIONS. HE ASKED IF THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF A US ABSTENTION ON SUCH A RESOLUTION. I AGAIN SAID I DID NOT WISH TO CREATE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT AND IT DID NOT LOOK TO ME LIKE AN ABSTENTION WAS A FEASIBLE COURSE OF ACTION ON SUCH A RESOLUTION.

4. KING SEEMED OBVIOUSLY SOMEWHAT HURT AND I WENT ON TO EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT WHAT I HAD TOLD HIM SEEMED TO ME TO BE COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH WHAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY AHERTON HAD EXPLAINED DURING HIS VISIT AND WHAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TELL HIM PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE. HE REPLIED THAT WHAT I HAD SAID WAS TRUE BUT HE DID NOT SEE ON THE ONE HAND HOW WE COULD VETO A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHILE AT THE SAME TIME GOING ON LATER TO PROPOSE THAT GENEVA BE RECONVENED (ON THE BASIS OF THE FORMULA WHICH I HAD EXPLAINED). THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS THE PARENT BODY OF GENEVA. IF THE ARABS WERE REBUFFED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HOW COULD THEY EXPECT TO PROCEED AT GENEVA OR ANYWHERE ELSE? IN PARTICULAR HE SAW THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A PLACE WHERE THE OBJECTIVES AND COURSE OF ACTION AT GENEVA COULD BE EXPLAINED AND WORKED OUT.

5. IN REPLY I TOLD HIM WHAT WE WISHED TO AVOID AT THE UNSC ANY CHANGE IN THE BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS. IF THE UNSC WERE TO CHANGE THAT FRAMEWORK IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT WE COULD NOT GET ALL THE PRESENT PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. ISRAEL HAD SAID IT WOULD NOT ATTEND UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. THEREFORE WHAT WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO DO WAS TO PRESERVE WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED UP TO THE PRESENT IN THE WAY OF ISRAELI ENGAGEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN ORDER TO MOVE TO GENEVA OR WHEREVER ELSE THE PARTIES MIGHT AGREE TO WORK ON THE PROCESS OF PEACE. WHILE WE SEEMED TO HAVE APPROACHED THE QUESTION FROM TWO DIFFERENT VANTAGE POINTS, I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT WE HAD A COMMON OBJECTIVE AND THAT WE SHOULD ALL BE CAREFUL NOT TO TEAR DOWN IN THE PROCESS OF THE

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SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ELEMENTS OF FUTURE FLEXIBILITY TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS.

6. KING INDICATED THAT IF THE US VETOED THE PRESENT PROPOSED SYRIAN-JORDANIAN RESOLUTION PRINCIPLES WHICH THEY CONSIDERED MODERATE HE HAD GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER SYRIA WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ATTENDING GENEVA. I SAID THAT I HAD NO INDEPENDENT BASIS ON

WHICH TO ANALYZE SYRIAN ATTITUDES, BUT THAT OUR
AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS WOULD BE TALKING WITH
ASAD IN EXACTLY THE SAME TERMS THAT I HAD DISCUSSED
WITH HIM. WE WOULD THEN PROBABLY HAVE SOME REACTION
FROM THE SYRIANS DIRECTLY ABOUT WHAT THEY WOULD DO.
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